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INTRODUCTION
The owner of Fair Play Bakery (“Fair Play”) decides he has had
enough of the pastries and that it is time to sell his whole bakery.
* © 2018 Robert T. Lucas IV.
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Fortunately, We Pastry Inc. (“We Pastry”), a national baking chain,
feels that the layout and products of Fair Play are unique and worth
copying, and the national baking chain quickly draws up a stock
purchase agreement to acquire Fair Play. After both parties execute
the stock purchase agreement, Fair Play changes its name to We Play
Fair and continues operating at a considerable, but less-thanprojected, profit. We Pastry, ever mindful of its profit margins,
decides to claw back some of its purchase price by demanding
$200,000 out of an escrow account that was set aside to indemnify We
Pastry if it suffered a loss due to undisclosed weaknesses in Fair Play’s
business. The terms of the stock purchase agreement contemplate
that We Pastry assumes the responsibility for We Play Fair’s
continued success, so a demand on the purchase price is sharp dealing
but also arguably deceptive and unfair.
However improper We Pastry’s activity may appear on its face,
North Carolina’s “unfair or deceptive practices” statute, commonly
known as section 75-1.1,1 will be unavailable to the baker of Fair Play
if he tries to sue for the $200,000 he is due under the stock purchase
agreement. Section 75-1.1 is inapplicable—not because North
Carolinians would consider We Pastry’s activity fair or would think
that the baker should pursue litigation under securities laws but
because courts have held that section 75-1.1 does not apply to
securities transactions. If We Pastry deceived customers about its
purportedly gluten-free croissants, it could be liable for treble
damages and attorneys’ fees,2 but because it unfairly deprived a baker
of $200,000 under a stock purchase agreement, the statute punishing
unfairness does not apply.
This hypothetical touches on a key issue in section 75-1.1 cases:
At what point does business activity become commerce that affects,
and potentially injures, consumers? Section 75-1.1 would apply to
unfair or deceptive acts in Fair Play’s sale of pastries to a customer
because that conduct is undoubtedly consumer related. Courts and
lawyers have more difficulty, however, in applying section 75-1.1 to
situations that do not involve an injury to an everyday customer.
Much of this difficulty arises when section 75-1.1 collides with
regulatory structures designed to address fraud or unfairness in
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (2017); see also Matthew W. Sawchak & Kip D. Nelson,
Defining Unfairness in “Unfair Trade Practices,” 90 N.C. L. REV. 2033, 2034 n.1 (2012)
(explaining why the authors “refer to this statute as ‘section 75-1.1’” in their article).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2017) (providing for treble damages for successful
claims); id. § 75-16.1 (authorizing discretionary attorneys’ fees).
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particular legal contexts, such as securities laws. A claim under such
regulatory structures also generally does not fall within the scope of
section 75-1.1 when the regulations adequately address the issue and
occupy the field. But when a plaintiff cannot otherwise address
unfairness in their business dealings, section 75-1.1 is intended to
provide an effective and necessary means of doing so. For more than
a quarter century, however, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has
left the law in limbo and undermined its potential as a remedial
backstop when regulatory schemes do not apply.
This Comment aims to define the contentious boundary between
section 75-1.1 jurisprudence and more pervasive regulatory structures
to demonstrate unworkable gaps in the law, focusing particularly on
securities transactions. This discussion highlights the potential of
section 75-1.1 as a tool to address unfairness when regulations fail to
provide a remedy for a particular type of misconduct. While many
regulatory agencies and laws are finely tuned to the field they
regulate, their application cannot extend beyond that field. Section
75-1.1 provides an opportunity to address misconduct that falls
between regulatory cracks. The discussion below aims to articulate
this role of section 75-1.1 as a regulatory backstop, not a regulatory
alternative, using the case law surrounding securities transactions as a
template.
The analysis proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the history of
section 75-1.1 and illustrates how it became a ubiquitous claim in
commercial lawsuits in North Carolina. This Part also explains how
section 75-1.1 claims became particularly problematic for courts in
North Carolina. Part II addresses the confrontation between section
75-1.1 and regulatory schemes generally and how the statute has been
used in, or more commonly held inapplicable to, those interactions.
Part III explains how the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision
in HAJMM Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc.3 greatly broadened
the securities exemption to section 75-1.1 and details the resulting
effect on section 75-1.1 as a potent tool in business disputes. Part IV
discusses an important question raised in the HAJMM dissent and the
impractical standard set forth in the majority opinion. Finally, Part V
suggests possible solutions to help tailor section 75-1.1 to the
boundary of pervasively regulated areas of law rather than dismissing
claims categorically because a regulatory structure might or might not
apply.
3. 328 N.C. 578, 403 S.E.2d 483 (1991).
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I. HISTORY OF SECTION 75-1.1 AND “COMMERCE”
Section 75-1.1 provides that “[u]nfair methods of competition in
or affecting commerce, and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in
or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.”4 Much of the litigation
surrounding this statute focuses on what precisely constitutes
“commerce.”5 The statute itself defines “commerce” to “include[] all
business activities, however denominated,”6 but that definition,
despite being the product of revision, is still subject to considerable
ambiguity upon review by the courts.7
The primary appeal of section 75-1.1 claims from the plaintiff’s
perspective comes in the statute’s award of treble damages and
possible attorneys’ fees.8 Plaintiffs regularly include section 75-1.1
claims because of the potential windfall and the difficulty courts face
when deciding whether a claim can survive a motion to dismiss.
This Part offers background on section 75-1.1’s development and
details how it evolved to include such a broad definition of commerce.
The discussion then turns to the challenges of applying such a broad
definition of commerce.
A. Section 75-1.1’s Increasingly Expansive Scope
The General Assembly enacted section 75-1.1’s current
definition of “commerce” after the Supreme Court of North Carolina
narrowly interpreted the original version of the statute to apply only
to those acts “involved in the bargain, sale, barter, exchange or
traffic” of goods.9 That original version of section 75-1.1, enacted in
1969, provided that “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (2017).
5. See, e.g., HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 594, 403 S.E.2d at 493; State ex rel. Edmisten v.
J. C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 315–16, 233 S.E.2d 895, 898–99 (1977), superseded by
statute, Act of June 27, 1977, ch. 747, sec. 2, § 75-1.1(b), 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 984, 984
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (2017)).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (2017).
7. The exceptions to section 75-1.1 tend to be the most ambiguous parts of the law.
For example, the “professional services” exception precludes section 75-1.1 liability for
“learned profession[s].” Id. Under North Carolina law, “learned profession” is an
undefined category that has expanded from encompassing only doctors, lawyers, and
theologians to now include architects and engineers. See RCDI Constr., Inc. v.
Spaceplan/Architecture, Planning, & Interiors, P.A., 148 F. Supp. 2d 607, 618–19
(W.D.N.C. 2001).
8. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2017) (providing for treble damages for successful
claims); id. § 75-16.1 (authorizing discretionary attorneys’ fees).
9. Edmisten, 292 N.C. at 316–17, 233 S.E.2d at 899.

97 N.C. L. REV. 163 (2018)

2018]

HAJMM LEGACY

167

are hereby declared unlawful.”10 Including the word “trade” in the
statute allowed for narrower judicial interpretation because activity
unrelated to a trade could be excepted.11 The statute as written did
not provide a conduct standard for violations, so courts imposed a
narrow standard by seizing on the “trade practices” language.12 The
General Assembly amended section 75-1.1 in 1977 to cover “all
business activities, however denominated,” but the statute still did not
prescribe a conduct standard.13
In addition to expansively defining commerce, section 75-1.1 also
imposes automatic treble damages and discretionary attorneys’ fees
on the unsuccessful defendant.14 These plaintiff-friendly features have
rendered section 75-1.1 a “boilerplate claim in most every complaint
based on a commercial or consumer transaction in North Carolina.”15
Accordingly, restraining “section 75-1.1 (along with its promise of
extraordinary damages) within its proper legal bounds” is a crucial
task for North Carolina’s courts.16 “‘[P]iggyback’ claims are
disfavored by North Carolina and federal courts alike,”17 leading to
the logical conclusion that section 75-1.1 should apply only in cases
where a more suitable remedy cannot be found in contract or other
applicable law.
Keeping section 75-1.1’s severe penalties narrowly constrained
highlights its role as a rare and powerful tool. The regulatory
10. Act of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, § 1(b), 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930, 930 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (2017)) (emphasis added).
11. Edmisten, 292 N.C. at 316, 233 S.E.2d at 899.
12. Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 1, at 2037–38.
13. Act of June 27, 1977, ch. 747, sec. 2, § 75-1.1(b), 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 984, 984
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (2017)).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2017) (“If any person shall be injured or the business of
any person, firm or corporation shall be broken up, destroyed or injured by reason of any
act or thing done by any other person, firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of
this Chapter, such person, firm or corporation so injured shall have a right of action on
account of such injury done, and if damages are assessed in such case judgment shall be
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by
the verdict.”); id. § 75-16.1 (“In any suit instituted by a person who alleges that the
defendant violated [section] 75-1.1, the presiding judge may, in his discretion, allow a
reasonable attorney fee to the duly licensed attorney representing the prevailing party,
such attorney fee to be taxed as a part of the court costs and payable by the losing party
. . . .”).
15. Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 347 (4th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Allied Distribs., Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 847 F. Supp. 376, 379 (E.D.N.C.
1993)).
16. Post v. Avita Drugs, LLC, No. 17 CVS 798, 2017 WL 4582151, at *4 (N.C. Bus. Ct.
Oct. 11, 2017).
17. Id.
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structures that govern many business interactions create difficulty in
applying section 75-1.1 appropriately without overextending its reach.
Even in the absence of a mandatory regulatory remedy, a court may
identify a “pervasive and intricate” regulatory scheme that already
occupies the field and thus refuse to apply section 75-1.1.18 The
difficult question for courts and lawyers alike, then, is what to do
when allegedly unfair or deceptive conduct arises out of a transaction
related to a regulatory scheme but the conduct itself is not actually
subject to the scheme’s regulations.
B.

A Consumer Protection Statute That Can Be Applied to Disputes
Between Businesses

The purpose of section 75-1.1 and the attending treble damages
provision in section 75-16 is “to establish an effective private cause of
action for aggrieved consumers” in North Carolina.19 That private
cause of action empowers consumers to defend themselves from
conduct that is not sufficiently covered by existing common law or
other regulations. Although section 75-1.1 “was clearly intended to
benefit consumers . . . its protections extend to businesses in
appropriate contexts.”20 Section 75-1.1 claims address even businessto-business transactions outside the consumer context because “unfair
trade practices involving only businesses affect the consumer as
well.”21 However, a “business is permitted to assert [a section 75-1.1]
claim against another business only when the businesses are
competitors (or potential competitors) or are engaged in commercial
dealings with each other.”22 Commerce between businesses ultimately
affects consumers, so market interactions between businesses fall
within section 75-1.1’s scope. 23
Section 75-1.1 claims for unfair or deceptive conduct fall into five
general categories:
1) general “unfair” conduct that offends public policy . . . [or] is
immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially
injurious to consumers; 2) “deceptive” misrepresentations that
18. See, e.g., Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 314 N.C. 267, 275, 333 S.E.2d 236, 241
(1985) (holding that “securities transactions are beyond the scope of [section] 75-1.1”).
19. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 543, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1981).
20. HAJMM Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 328 N.C. 578, 592, 403 S.E.2d 483,
492 (1991).
21. United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 665, 370 S.E.2d 375, 389 (1988).
22. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 520 (4th Cir. 1999).
23. Id. at 519–20 (quoting Kuykendall, 322 N.C. at 665, 370 S.E.2d at 389).
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have the capacity or tendency to deceive the average person; 3)
per se violations of § 75-1.1 established upon proof of a
statutory or regulatory violation or the commission of certain
torts; 4) a breach of contract accompanied by aggravating
circumstances; and 5) anti-competitive conduct.24
The discussion in Part II focuses on the first and second
categories,
which
cover
unfair
conduct
and
deceptive
misrepresentations. These categories allow considerable flexibility
and ideally contribute to section 75-1.1’s effectiveness as a tool for
courts to punish and remedy bad action in the business community.
The general unfairness category appears to give the statute broad
license to combat unscrupulous business activity and should justify
section 75-1.1 as a de facto regulatory tool when other regulatory
schemes do not provide a remedy.
Section 75-1.1’s potential as a highly effective tool in disputes
between businesses, however, is hampered by overbroad or loosely
defined exemptions. One such exemption is the Supreme Court of
North Carolina’s categorical position that “securities transactions are
beyond the scope of [section] 75-1.1.”25 While this securities
exemption doctrine was founded on the strong principle that section
75-1.1 should not be used to add unnecessary complexity to already
complex areas of law, like securities regulation, its ultimate effect
illustrates the difficulty of drawing the line between useful section 751.1 protection and a pervasive regulatory scheme.
II. APPLYING SECTION 75-1.1 WHEN REGULATIONS OCCUPY THE
FIELD
Though the North Carolina General Assembly intended for
section 75-1.1’s scope to be broad,26 courts have limited the statute’s
scope when other regulations occupy the field. This Part examines
section 75-1.1’s interaction with, and often its inapplicability to, an
area of law that is already subject to sprawling regulatory structures.
First, this Part introduces the foundational reasoning of the securities
exemption to show how formal regulations can deal with disputes
24. Sparks v. Oxy-Health, LLC, 134 F. Supp. 3d 961, 997–98 (E.D.N.C. 2015) (internal
citations omitted); see also Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 1, at 2042–50 (discussing each
type of section 75-1.1 claim).
25. Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 314 N.C. 267, 275, 333 S.E.2d 236, 241 (1985)
(adopting the securities exemption of the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Lindner v. Durham
Hosiery Mills, Inc., 761 F.2d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 1985)).
26. See supra Section I.A.
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more effectively than section 75-1.1. Second, the discussion turns to
the interesting development that private regulations are sufficient to
resolve disputes effectively and allow courts to further narrow section
75-1.1’s applicability by providing parties another avenue to air their
grievances.
A. Containing Section 75-1.1’s Scope When Formal Regulatory
Structures Apply
The original securities exemption to section 75-1.1 provided
courts with a proper and useful reason to dismiss a claim—the
transaction at issue clearly fell within the exclusive scope of securities
laws. Section 75-1.1’s applicability to securities transactions was an
issue of first impression as late as 1985, when Lindner v. Durham
Hosiery Mills, Inc.27 led the Fourth Circuit to “ascertain what the
North Carolina Supreme Court would decide” if determining the
scope of section 75-1.1.28 Referring to the federal law that provided
the framework for section 75-1.1,29 the Lindner court relied on “the
fact that no federal court decision [had] applied § 5(a)(1) of the
[Federal Trade Commission] Act to securities transactions [as]
additional evidence of the scope of § 75-1.1.”30 The Lindner court
ultimately concluded that “securities transactions are beyond the
reach of [section 75-1.1].”31
In Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,32 The Supreme Court of North
Carolina adopted the Lindner securities exemption with its decision.33
Looking to other jurisdictions in support of its decision, the Skinner
court noted that its “research reveal[ed] no case in which a state court
has held that its unfair trade practices act extends to securities
transactions.”34 Importantly, the Skinner court reasoned that
securities transactions are “already subject to pervasive and intricate
regulation under the North Carolina Securities Act”; therefore,
applying section 75-1.1’s protections to securities “could subject those
27. 761 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1985).
28. Id. at 165.
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby
declared unlawful.”).
30. Lindner, 761 F.2d at 167.
31. Id. at 168.
32. 314 N.C. 267, 333 S.E.2d 236 (1985).
33. Id. at 275, 333 S.E.2d at 241 (holding that “securities transactions are beyond the
scope of [section] 75-1.1”).
34. Id. at 274, 333 S.E.2d at 241.
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involved with securities transactions to overlapping supervision and
enforcement.”35
Securities laws are finely tuned to address subtle instances of
unfairness and deception related to the exchange of securities within
the scope of regulation.36 The effectiveness of securities laws within
their arena should not be confused with the potential or need for
robust legal frameworks to address misconduct in business dealings
that do not fall within the defined area of securities regulation.
Fortunately, securities laws govern only one of many pervasively
regulated areas of law.37

35. Id. at 275, 333 S.E.2d at 241 (quoting Lindner, 761 F.2d at 167–68). Securities
supervision and enforcement sufficiently provided by securities laws may assist with
illustrating section 75-1.1’s applicability or inapplicability. See Opper v. Hancock Secs.
Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), abrogated by Asch v. Philips, Appel & Walden,
Inc., 867 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1989). Opper demonstrates how to address deceptive
misrepresentations in a securities transaction entirely through federal securities laws. See
id. at 673. The case also shows that federal securities laws tend to provide the most
effective remedy in a conventional securities setting. Id. Applying basic principles of
agency law, securities laws, and SEC regulations, the Opper court found a “garden variety
instance of deception, nondisclosure, and self-preferment by a broker purporting to act as
a selling agent.” Id. The broker-defendant in Opper misrepresented its efforts to sell
securities on behalf of the plaintiff while continuing to sell thousands of its own shares in
the same company for considerable profit at prices it fraudulently told the plaintiff were
not available. Id. Having noted a violation of fiduciary principles in agency law, the court
also applied provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5. Id.;
see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). Analyzing case law, the Opper court endorsed the
“settled” precedent that Congress meant to address “the particularized problems of
‘manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent’ practices in the securities markets . . .
mean[ing] to reach frauds that ‘may take on more subtle and involved forms than those in
which dishonesty manifests itself in cruder and less specialized activities.’” Opper, 250 F.
Supp. at 673 (quoting Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 798 n.5, 803 (8th Cir. 1943)).
36. Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1943).
37. Courts continue to identify fields that properly resolve disputes and render section
75-1.1 redundant and inapplicable. See, e.g., Hagy v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., No. 3:15CV-509-RJC-DCK, 2016 WL 5661530, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 28, 2016) (explaining that
while a plaintiff’s section 75-1.1 claim is not essentially preempted by the Medicare
scheme, the scope of section 75-1.1 does not cover an issue already pervasively regulated);
Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Hunsucker, 38 N.C. App. 414, 420–21, 248 S.E.2d 567, 570
(1978) (declining to extend section 75-1.1 to commodities exchanges, an area Congress
aimed to regulate thoroughly and exclusively). Some cases show that state regulatory
schemes are equally as effective at occupying the field as federal schemes. See, e.g., Tobias
v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 1:17CV486, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48, at *11 (M.D.N.C.
Jan. 2, 2018) (“Article 2 of Chapter 75 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, entitled
‘Prohibited Acts by Debt Collectors’, is the exclusive remedy under North Carolina law
for unfair debt collection practices.”); State ex rel. Cooper v. Ridgeway Brands Mfg., LLC,
184 N.C. App. 613, 624, 646 S.E.2d 790, 798 (2007) (declining to apply section 75-1.1 when
a North Carolina law directing tobacco producers to deposit money into an escrow fund
“provides an extensive remedy for failure to comply with the escrow obligation” (citing
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The Supreme Court of North Carolina has provided some
guidance on the effect of regulations that, when violated, do not
automatically trigger section 75-1.1 protection. The effect of a
regulatory violation on a section 75-1.1 claim, however, remains
unclear. When deciding if a licensing violation could constitute a
section 75-1.1 claim, the court has “decline[d] to hold that a violation
of a licensing regulation is a [section 75-1.1 violation] as a matter of
law.”38 Failure to comply with licensing rules could, however,
evidence a section 75-1.1 violation.39 This distinction presumably
means that section 75-1.1 could be useful as a force multiplier for
minor regulatory violations, but the court declined to state which
regulations could support a section 75-1.1 claim and which regulations
sufficiently remedy a violation without applying the statute.40
Thus, regulatory violations that themselves cannot give rise to a
section 75-1.1 claim may nevertheless constitute evidence to support
the claim. However, more direct judicial discussion is necessary
regarding section 75-1.1’s value as a punitive tool to add force in
addressing minor violations rather than including the statute as a
burdensome addition to more pervasive regulatory schemes. It is
possible that the “violation of a regulatory statute designed to protect
the consuming public may constitute an unfair or deceptive practice,
even where the statute itself does not provide for a private right of
action.”41 However, this is true “only where the regulatory statute
specifically defines and proscribes conduct which is unfair or
deceptive within” the scope of section 75-1.1.42
B.

Private Dispute Resolution Structures

Defining the boundary between a regulatory scheme that could
substantiate a section 75-1.1 claim and a scheme that may preempt a
section 75-1.1 claim ultimately determines whether the claim can
survive as a matter of law. The previous section focused on statutory
HAJMM Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 328 N.C. 578, 593, 403 S.E.2d 483, 493
(1991))), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 362 N.C. 431, 666 S.E.2d 107 (2008).
38. Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 71, 653 S.E.2d 393, 399
(2007).
39. Id.
40. See id. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 398–99; Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 1, at 2045
n.55 (“The court . . . said little about why licensing regulations are less appropriate triggers
for per se section 75-1.1 violations than other types of regulations are.”).
41. Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), LLC, 199 N.C. App. 163, 170, 681 S.E.2d
448, 454 (2009) (citing Stanley v. Moore, 339 N.C. 717, 723, 454 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1995)).
42. Id.

97 N.C. L. REV. 163 (2018)

2018]

HAJMM LEGACY

173

or agency-generated regulatory structures. But the inapplicability of
section 75-1.1 to some regulatory schemes is not limited to just public
regulatory schemes. As a recent Fourth Circuit case illustrates,
section 75-1.1 may also be preempted by private codes of conduct.43
In Champion Pro Consulting Group, Inc. v. Impact Sports
Football, LLC,44 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a section
75-1.1 claim related to Robert Quinn, a former football star at the
University of North Carolina, and his decision to switch agents.45
Although the Champion Pro court admitted that the pervasive and
intricate regulation in place, the National Football League Players
Association’s (“NFLPA”) dispute resolution system, was “not a
statutory scheme,” the court nevertheless applied a preemption
reasoning similar to that in Skinner based on the fact that “the
NFLPA has created an extensive regulatory regime to govern
business activities within the industry.”46 The Champion Pro court
was satisfied that the NFLPA system “provided a remedy for
violations in the form of monetary damages and a means to obtain
that remedy through arbitration.”47 The court also noted that the
NFLPA views itself as a regulatory body over industry issues relating
to NFL players and their representatives, and applying section 75-1.1
in that regulatory context would impose overlapping regulations like
those rejected by Skinner.48
Champion Pro illustrates that the availability of a remedy under
a pervasive and intricate scheme clearly plays a central role in
dismissing a section 75-1.1 claim. A plaintiff with an available or more
suitable means of recovery through existing regulatory structures,
even if those structures are private codes of conduct, will face a high
bar to sustain a section 75-1.1 claim.49 Dismissal as a matter of law
may await cases that implicate extensively regulated issues as judges

43. Champion Pro Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Impact Sports Football, LLC, 845 F.3d 104,
110 (4th Cir. 2016) (dismissing a section 75-1.1 claim based on allegations “already subject
to an extensive regulatory regime under the NFLPA”).
44. 845 F.3d 104 (4th Cir. 2016).
45. Id. at 112; see also Stephen Feldman, Can Extensive Regulations Bar a Claim for
Unfair Trade Practices?, ELLIS & WINTERS: WHAT’S FAIR? (Feb. 14, 2017),
http://www.unfairtradepracticesnc.com/can-extensive-regulatory-regime-bar-claim-unfair-tradepractices/ [https://perma.cc/7MCF-7EJV].
46. Champion Pro, 845 F.3d at 111.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Feldman, supra note 45.
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defer to the expedience of a system particularly designed to resolve
the matter.
A question remains, however, as to what happens to section 751.1 claims that relate to a pervasive and intricate body of law but
nonetheless fall outside its protections. Unfortunately, the current
answer in North Carolina is that section 75-1.1 also fails to cover
those claims as a matter of law.
III. EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS OUTSIDE OF BUSINESS ACTIVITIES:
HAJMM’S EXPANSION OF SECTION 75-1.1’S SECURITIES EXEMPTION
The reasoning that drove the Skinner court to exempt securities
transactions from North Carolina’s section 75-1.1 protection creates a
reasonable scope for the exemption—securities laws are designed to
serve as the primary method of recovery and boundary of liability for
securities-related transactions. Similarly, the Champion Pro plaintiff
could find a satisfactory and perhaps more effective resolution
through the applicable NFLPA channels.50 It is reasonable to expect
that specifically tailored regulatory schemes can dispose of particular
disputes better than section 75-1.1. Imposing liability under section
75-1.1 would seem possible, though, when the regulatory scheme in
question clearly has no capacity to regulate unfairness or deception
that arises in a transaction. Cases involving modern securities
transactions, which are no longer subject to the same reasoning
applied in Skinner, show that courts still decline to apply section 751.1 protections despite the unavailability of a remedy by other means.
This Part identifies gaps in section 75-1.1 jurisprudence since
HAJMM Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc. was decided in the
early 1990s. The discussion first explains the facts of HAJMM and
analyzes the decision’s precedent-setting diversion from Skinner.
Next, it explores the true impact of the decision, highlighting how it
broadened the securities exemption and overly narrowed section 751.1’s applicability.
A. HAJMM’s Unusual Facts and the Broadening of Section 75-1.1’s
Securities Exemption
The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision in HAJMM
reinterpreted the securities exemption six years after Skinner. In
HAJMM, a case involving unregulated revolving fund certificates

50. See Champion Pro, 845 F.3d at 111.
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instead of “conventional corporate securities,”51 the court held “that
the legislature simply did not intend for the trade, issuance and
redemption of corporate securities or similar financial instruments to
be transactions ‘in or affecting commerce’ as those terms are used in
N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1(a).”52 The court then narrowly defined “business
activities,” holding the term to mean “the manner in which businesses
conduct their regular, day-to-day activities, or affairs, such as the
purchase and sale of goods, or whatever other activities the business
regularly engages in and for which it is organized.”53
The defendant in HAJMM, House of Raeford Farms, Inc.
(“Raeford”), was a “North Carolina agricultural cooperative engaged
in the business of processing turkeys and other poultry.”54 Raeford
raised money when the plaintiff and two other turkey producers sold
their interests in Raeford Turkey Farms, Inc. (“RTF”) in exchange
for “revolving fund certificates issued by Raeford. The certificates
became part of Raeford’s capital structure and [were] shown as
stockholder’s equity on Raeford’s balance sheet.”55 The Raeford
certificates valued the plaintiff’s RTF interests at $387,500 and noted
that the certificates would be retired at the sole discretion of
Raeford’s board with no date of maturity.56 The certificates were
meant to create “a revolving fund for the purpose of building up such
an amount of capital as may be deemed necessary by the board of
directors from time to time and for revolving such capital.”57
Raeford redeemed the certificates given to the other turkey
producers but refused to retire the plaintiff’s certificate.58 A key piece
of the plaintiff’s argument in support of its section 75-1.1 claim was
that Raeford never intended to retire the certificate or pay it despite
having sufficient cash on hand to cover the $387,500 sum.59 The jury
concluded that Raeford’s refusal to retire the certificate was not “an
open, fair and honest transaction” and awarded the plaintiff $100,000

51. HAJMM Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 328 N.C. 578, 594, 403 S.E.2d 483,
493 (1991).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 580, 403 S.E.2d at 485.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 581, 403 S.E.2d at 485–86.
57. Id. at 581, 403 S.E.2d at 486.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 581–82, 403 S.E.2d at 486.

97 N.C. L. REV. 163 (2018)

176

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

in punitive damages in addition to $387,500 in compensatory
damages.60
On appeal, a majority of the Supreme Court of North Carolina
applied the securities exemption despite admitting that the revolving
fund certificates at issue were “not subject to the same extensive
statutory provisions and administrative regulation that govern more
conventional corporate securities.”61 Without citing a case or other
authority, the HAJMM majority defined “business activities” for
section 75-1.1 purposes to include only “activities the business
regularly engages in and for which it is organized.”62 Accordingly, the
securities exemption as originally stated in Skinner did not provide
the main basis for dismissing the section 75-1.1 claim in HAJMM,
thereby adding an entirely new aspect to the securities exemption
doctrine.
Following HAJMM, the securities exemption precludes claims
based on events that fall outside the business’s day-to-day activities,
even if those less common activities are vital to running the business.63
Transactions relating in any meaningful way to securities are
therefore not business activities within the scope of section 75-1.1,
and unfair or deceptive practices conducted with regard to those
securities or other extraordinary events in the life of the business do
not form a cause of action under the statute.64 This unfortunate
limitation on the statute highlights section 75-1.1’s role in providing a
potential remedy when no other avenue is open to a plaintiff and
undermines the Skinner analysis of pervasive and intricate regulatory
schemes that previously formed the heart of the securities exemption
doctrine.
B.

“Extraordinary Events” as a New Basis for Dismissing Section 751.1 Claims

The HAJMM majority reasoned that “[t]he issuance of securities
is an extraordinary event done for the purpose of raising capital in
order that the enterprise can either be organized for the purpose of
conducting its business activities or, if already a going concern, to
enable it to continue its business activities.”65 Interpreting this
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 582–83, 403 S.E.2d at 486–87.
Id. at 594, 403 S.E.2d at 493.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 594–95, 403 S.E.2d at 493.
Id. at 594, 403 S.E.2d at 493.
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reasoning requires further note that “the securities exception is not
limited to the purchase and sale of securities—‘[s]ecurities
transactions are related to the creation, transfer, or retirement of
capital.’”66 The HAJMM transmutation of Skinner’s securities
exemption thus covers the entire life cycle of any capital-raising
transaction, whether or not the transaction can be regulated by
traditional securities laws.
The problem with this reasoning, as now-Chief Justice Mark
Martin correctly noted in his dissent, is that conducting a business
necessarily involves capital-raising efforts and transactions.67
Moreover, the HAJMM majority “cite[d] no authority, and our
statute and cases provide[d] none, to support its argument that
‘commerce’ means only the ‘regular, day-to-day activities or affairs’ of
a business.”68 This was true even as the majority reasoned that the
revolving fund certificates served the “same function served by
issuing more conventional corporate securities,” and the court’s
“conclusion in Skinner that [section 75-1.1] does not apply to
corporate securities should also extend to revolving fund certificates
unless there is good reason to treat the certificates differently.”69
Accepting the argument that the Supreme Court of North
Carolina has a responsibility to hand down precedent-making
decisions, the HAJMM flaw creates problems because the decision is
more akin to legislation on the scope of section 75-1.1 rather than
judicial guidance. The HAJMM court could not logically apply the
Skinner exemption because revolving certificates are unregulated
forms of securities, but the majority apparently felt the need to
restrain the statute’s use and create new grounds for dismissing
tenuous claims. However valid that goal may have been, the HAJMM
rule now provides a sweeping basis to dismiss claims whenever unfair
or deceptive conduct occurs outside the most core functions of the
business. The problem is that doing business involves much more than
conducting day-to-day operations, and HAJMM makes section 75-1.1
unavailable in those less common business events.
The fatal error in HAJMM came in the majority’s failure to
recognize that “revolving fund certificates are not subject to the same
66. Sloan v. Inolife Techs., Inc., No. 17 CVS 306, 2017 WL 2268401, at *9 (N.C. Bus.
Ct. May 22, 2017) (quoting HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 594, 403 S.E.2d at 493).
67. See HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 596, 403 S.E.2d at 494 (Martin, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 593, 403 S.E.2d at 493 (majority opinion).
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extensive statutory provisions and administrative regulation that
govern more conventional corporate securities” and that
differentiating between the certificates and conventional securities
was thus justifiable.70 Cases disposing of section 75-1.1 claims in the
pervasive regulation context justifiably do so when that regulatory
scheme provides a remedial alternative.71 The HAJMM certificates,
by contrast, confronted an admittedly “incidental” and “largely
advisory rather than mandatory” level of involvement from any
regulatory agency.72 The majority continued on its “extraordinary
event” line of reasoning without precedential support, holding that
[s]ecurities transactions are related to the creation, transfer, or
retirement of capital. Unlike regular purchase and sale of
goods, or whatever else the enterprise was organized to do, they
are not “business activities” as that term is used in [section 751.1]. They are not, therefore, “in or affecting commerce,” even
under a reasonably broad interpretation of the legislative intent
underlying these terms.73
The HAJMM court did not elaborate on or analyze that
legislative intent, and the decision left subsequent courts to speculate
what a “broad interpretation” of that intent may entail.74 The
majority’s conclusory language would have to suffice for precedential
value, explaining flatly that “[r]evolving fund certificates are a
cooperative’s functional equivalent of traditional corporate securities.
They are capital-raising devices. We conclude, therefore, that, like
more conventional securities, issuance or redemption of revolving
fund certificates are not ‘in or affecting commerce’ and are not
subject to [section 75-1.1].”75 Unlike more conventional securities, of
course, the certificates and those misusing them are subject to no
regulatory scheme or its accompanying protections or punishments,
leaving a gap in the legal coverage that section 75-1.1 could fill.
IV. THE HAJMM DISSENT
Justice Martin dissented from the HAJMM conclusion that a
section 75-1.1 claim involving capital-raising activity could not survive
70. Id. at 594, 403 S.E.2d at 493.
71. See, e.g., Champion Pro Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Impact Sports Football, LLC, 845
F.3d 104, 111 (4th Cir. 2016).
72. HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 594, 403 S.E.2d at 493.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 595, 403 S.E.2d at 493.
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as a matter of law. In his dissent, Justice Martin questioned “[h]ow . . .
raising funds to operate a business” could not be considered a
“business activity.”76 This Part discusses why that question is vital to
section 75-1.1 jurisprudence moving forward and how HAJMM as
precedent makes the question only more important to ask. After
highlighting the practical realities Justice Martin raised in his dissent,
this Part uses cases relying on HAJMM to illustrate its unworkable
standard.
A. Justice Martin’s Predictions in HAJMM
The restrictive effect of the majority’s reasoning became clear in
later cases,77 but Justice Martin forecasted the transformational effect
the holding would have on the Skinner securities exemption and its
broader reasoning regarding pervasive regulation. As he noted in
dissent:
The majority relies heavily upon cases involving securities
transactions. However, these cases are inapposite, because they
were decided upon the theory that securities transactions were
already subject to extensive regulation under state and federal
law, and the application of [section] 75-1.1 would subject such
transactions to overlapping supervision and enforcement.78
Justice Martin aptly criticized “the startling argument” that the
issuance of unregulated certificates intended to raise capital for a
business is “not a ‘business activity’ within the meaning of the
statute.”79
Justice Martin argued that businesses cannot function in a
modern economy without raising capital.80 Additionally, not all
businesses have the resources, sophistication, or will to issue
traditional securities that allow investors to rely on the regulatory
structure surrounding sophisticated securities. Eliminating section 751.1 protections in the absence of a regulatory remedy “loses touch

76. Id. at 596, 403 S.E.2d at 494 (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. See, e.g., Latigo Invs. II, LLC v. Waddell & Reed Fin., Inc., No. 06 CVS 18666,
2007 WL 2570753, at *5 (N.C. Bus. Ct. May 22, 2007) (requiring a North Carolina Business
Court judge to dismiss a section 75-1.1 claim because the claim related to unfairness in the
context of a capital-raising transaction).
78. HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 596, 403 S.E.2d at 494 (Martin, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
79. Id.
80. Id. (“The acquisition of capital in one form or another is the lifeblood today for
business.”).
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with the reality of the business world,” where businesspeople need
investors and investors need remedies.81 The HAJMM majority
created a dangerous loophole in section 75-1.1; a restrictive definition
of business activities as “the day-to-day affairs of the business
eliminates most of the raising of business capital from the protection
of the statute. The most important area of business life is no longer
subject to [section 75-1.1], but the sales of a baker, for example,
remain.”82
Section 75-1.1, by its text, applies to “all business activities,
however denominated.”83 How then could a baker be liable under
section 75-1.1 for unscrupulous sales of baked goods but not
deception related to raising money to run his business? Justice Martin
correctly asserted in HAJMM that “[n]o matter how one twists it, the
issuance of the certificate and defendant’s refusal to redeem it were
business activities within the meaning of [section 75-1.1].”84 As Justice
Martin emphasized, HAJMM’s effect in expanding the Skinner
exemption at best muddies the boundary between section 75-1.1 and
pervasively regulated areas of law. At worst, the decision leaves
investors holding nontraditional securities, like revolving fund
certificates, vulnerable by giving them no protection under section 751.1 and allowing unscrupulous businesspeople to evade a statute that
could effectively deter unfair and deceptive dealing.
B.

HAJMM’s Rule Makes “Extraordinary Events” Out of Most
Regular Business Activities Related to Securities

The Supreme Court of North Carolina subsequently described
HAJMM as a simple case of statutory interpretation, noting “that our
General Assembly demonstrated with the text of [section 75-1.1] that
it intended [section 75-1.1] to regulate a business’s regular
interactions with other market participants.”85 If HAJMM’s effect had
remained so limited in its scope, that characterization would have
been helpful in differentiating cases where section 75-1.1 should apply
to complement existing regulatory structures and those where the
regulation sufficiently occupies the field. However, the HAJMM
restriction of section 75-1.1 to “activities the business regularly
81. Id. at 596, 403 S.E.2d at 495.
82. Id. at 596–97, 403 S.E.2d at 495.
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (2017).
84. HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 597, 403 S.E.2d at 495 (Martin, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
85. White v. Thompson, 364 N.C. 47, 51, 691 S.E.2d 676, 679 (2010).
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engages in”86 created an entire body of case law that categorically
applies the securities exemption to dismiss section 75-1.1 claims
related to capital-raising or securities transactions, regardless of
whether any other regulatory remedy or oversight applies.87
Unfortunately, the malleability of HAJMM’s definition of
“business activity” has also led North Carolina courts to expand the
reach of the capital-raising exemption. Take, for example, Oberlin
Capital, L.P. v. Slavin.88 In that case, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a section 75-1.1 claim relating to
alleged misrepresentations made to acquire a loan simply because the
loan had a capital-raising aspect.89 Though not all courts have viewed
HAJMM favorably, the decision remains good law and generally
leaves lower courts with their hands tied, requiring them to dismiss or
affirm dismissals of otherwise viable claims.
Prior to his appointment to the Fourth Circuit, Judge Albert
Diaz issued an important decision on the HAJMM formulation of the
securities exemption while serving on the North Carolina Business
Court. In Latigo Investments II, LLC v. Waddell & Reed Financial,
Inc.,90 Judge Diaz found the plaintiffs’ attempts to distinguish
HAJMM and Oberlin “unavailing” because a “[c]ourt’s proper focus
under the relevant cases is not ‘who is a party to the transaction,’ but
rather ‘what is the purpose of the transaction.’”91 North Carolina
Business Court judges decide many motions to dismiss section 75-1.1
claims under the HAJMM standard, and the dispositive issue for their
analysis under HAJMM is simply “whether the transactions at issue
involved securities or other financial instruments involved in raising
capital.”92

86. HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 594, 403 S.E.2d at 493.
87. See, e.g., Oberlin Capital, L.P. v. Slavin, 147 N.C. App. 52, 62, 554 S.E.2d 840, 848
(2001) (relying on HAJMM to find that the trial court properly dismissed the claim for
unfair and deceptive trade practices “[b]ecause the loan agreement at issue here, which
also granted Oberlin the right to purchase stock in [the debtor corporation] in the future,
was primarily a capital-raising device [and] it was not ‘in or affecting commerce’”).
88. 147 N.C. App. 52, 554 S.E.2d 840 (2001).
89. Id. at 62, 554 S.E.2d at 848; see also Latigo Invs. II, LLC v. Waddell & Reed Fin.,
Inc., No. 06 CVS 18666, 2007 WL 2570753, at *4 (N.C. Bus. Ct. May 22, 2007) (explaining
that “[i]n Oberlin, our Court of Appeals expanded the reach of the [section 75-1.1]
securities exception”).
90. No. 06 CVS 18666, 2007 WL 2570753 (N.C. Bus. Ct. May 22, 2007).
91. Id. at *4.
92. Id. at *5 (quoting White v. Consol. Planning, Inc., 166 N.C. App. 283, 304, 603
S.E.2d 147, 161 (2004)).
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Judge Diaz, in a moment of judicial candor, said in his Latigo
opinion that “[w]ere I writing on a clean slate, I would not dismiss
Plaintiffs’ [section 75-1.1] claim as, like Justice Martin, I find no
logical basis for excluding misrepresentations made in the context of
capital raising transactions from the reach of what is intended to be a
broad remedial statute.”93 Summarizing his Latigo holding, however,
Judge Diaz explained that “because the undisputed purpose of the
transaction in this case . . . was to raise capital . . . it is not a
transaction ‘in or affecting commerce’ as that element has been
defined by the cases,” and he dismissed the section 75-1.1 claim
accordingly.94 Judge Diaz’s commentary indicates the unworkable and
overly broad standard Business Court judges are bound to apply
when deciding a section 75-1.1 claim under the HAJMM precedent.
Even in cases where the ordinary business activities of a
company involve the sale of securities, a section 75-1.1 claim cannot
survive dismissal based on HAJMM and its progeny. In DeGorter v.
Capitol Bancorp Ltd.,95 for example, the “Plaintiff allege[d]
Defendants’ conduct regarding the role of the trust preferred
securities offering in the . . . transaction constituted unfair or
deceptive trade practices under . . . section 75-1.1.”96 The DeGorter
claim was based on evidence that the defendant “deceived [the
plaintiff] into purchasing the . . . securities by misrepresenting or
failing to timely disclose pertinent information about the financial
position of [the defendant].”97 The DeGorter court, like Judge Diaz in
Latigo, was bound to dismiss the section 75-1.1 claim because
“whether Plaintiff was unfairly induced to purchase the trust
preferred securities as part of a larger misrepresentation . . . [was]
irrelevant. The only relevant question [was] whether securities were
involved in the transaction. The issue at hand [was] plainly securitiesrelated.”98 Dismissing a section 75-1.1 claim when no other regulatory
structure covers unfairness demonstrates that the HAJMM
formulation of the securities exemption has proven unworkable and
contrary to the purpose of a statute that plainly outlaws “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”99

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
No. 11 CVS 20825, 2011 WL 3300304 (N.C. Bus. Ct. July 29, 2011).
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *6.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (2017).
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Perhaps the most recent example of the HAJMM conundrum is
Tillery Environmental LLC v. A&D Holdings, Inc.,100 another
Business Court case that arose after the conclusion of a merger and
concerned the final disbursement of the purchase price. The Tillery
dispute was within the scope of the HAJMM securities exemption
because the merger between the plaintiff and defendant companies
admittedly constituted an extraordinary event for those companies.
A&D Holdings, Inc. (“A&D”) and JBC Acquisition, Inc. (“JBC”)
merged as a result of a stock purchase agreement.101 Thereafter, the
allegedly unfair act arose during “a dispute over funds held in
escrow.”102 The businesses’ day-to-day operations involved industrial
cleaning, so a merger undoubtedly qualified as an unusual event in
the life of the business.103 The stock purchase agreement executed a
transaction involving securities and formed the foundation of the
dispute.104 The escrow fund left over as the last of the purchase price
to be disbursed, however, sustained an ongoing business interaction
between the parties even after the transaction closed because
“eighteen months after the stock purchase closed and four days
before the Escrow Funds were to be distributed to Tillery, A&D (as
JBC’s successor entity) made an indemnification demand to
Tillery.”105
Tillery, bringing the section 75-1.1 claim over the indemnity
demand, alleged that A&D’s demand amounted to an adjustment of
the purchase price negotiated in the merger because the postmerger
business was performing poorly.106 As a result of the indemnity
demand, however, “[t]he Escrow Agent continue[d] to hold the
Escrow Funds . . . until it receive[d] either a court order or joint
release instructions agreed to by the parties.”107 The demand was
therefore successful in blocking the final execution of the agreement
regardless of its merit.
Noting the difficulty of placing Tillery’s claim in the landscape of
post-HAJMM case law, Judge Bledsoe wrote that

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

No. 17 CVS 6525, 2017 WL 3335764 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Aug. 4, 2017).
Id. at *1.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at *2.
See id.
Id.
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[u]nder Skinner alone, Plaintiff’s [section 75-1.1] claim would
likely survive. Plaintiff’s allegations focus on Defendants’
alleged post-closing attempts to lay claim to the Escrow Funds
through improper indemnification demands a year and a half
after the stock purchase closed. Although this action arose out
of the sale of securities, Plaintiff’s allegations of post-closing
misconduct under the Escrow Agreement do not appear to
involve conduct “already subject to pervasive and intricate
regulation.”108
HAJMM, however, bound Judge Bledsoe to dismiss Tillery’s
section 75-1.1 claim under the securities exemption. As he explained,
“[a]lthough Defendants’ allegedly wrongful conduct occurred nearly
eighteen months after the securities transaction closed, Defendants’
conduct is inextricably tied to the sale of securities and the Stock
Purchase Agreement.”109 Additional application of HAJMM showed
that the conduct complained of was not an ordinary business event, as
Defendants’ alleged actions—making improper indemnification
demands under a specific Stock Purchase Agreement and
Escrow Agreement—are not indicative of a business’s regular,
day-to-day activities or affairs. Indeed, the indemnification
demands made here can only occur once between these parties;
after the Escrow Agent has made a final distribution of the
Escrow Funds, the parties will have no further ongoing
relationship.110
Judge Bledsoe explained that the court could not sustain a
section 75-1.1 claim when “the facts alleged in the Complaint . . . do
not describe the parties’ regular, day-to-day business activities. Thus,
under HAJMM, Plaintiff has failed to allege conduct ‘in or affecting
commerce’ under section 75-1.1, requiring dismissal of Plaintiff’s
[section 75-1.1] claim.”111
Tillery demonstrates HAJMM’s overreach in the securities
context. The allegedly unfair and deceptive conduct—the defendant’s
taking approximately $2.7 million hostage—could not be judged
under the statute based only on the fact that the stock purchase
agreement represented a securities sale. Judge Bledsoe noted that the
“conduct [was] inextricably tied to the sale of securities,” but
108. Id. at *5 (quoting Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 314 N.C. 267, 275, 333 S.E.2d 236,
241 (1985)).
109. Id. at *6.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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HAJMM nevertheless equates conduct tied to securities with conduct
potentially remedied under securities laws.112 The Tillery decision
explicitly notes that such a remedy was not available because the
pervasive regulatory scheme that justified Skinner was not available
to the plaintiff in Tillery.113 On one hand, the HAJMM rule simplifies
the calculus for lower courts by allowing them to grant motions to
dismiss whenever a securities-related transaction is at issue. On the
other hand, the rule nullifies the usefulness of section 75-1.1 as a
regulatory gap-filler because any potential remedy through the
securities regulation apparatus becomes inapplicable. All that matters
is whether a security changes hands or capital is raised, not whether
an allegedly injured plaintiff can seek redress.
C.

The Rare Exceptions to HAJMM’s Rule

The absence of regulatory liability in securities-related cases has
allowed some courts to deny motions to dismiss section 75-1.1 claims,
though these instances appear to represent factually distinguishable
exceptions to HAJMM rather than the rule. In Hand v. Ace Hardware
Corp.,114 for instance, the plaintiffs bought small amounts of stock in a
franchise through a franchise agreement.115 The plaintiffs later sued
the franchisor, including a section 75-1.1 claim.116 The court denied a
motion to dismiss the claim under the securities exemption because
Plaintiffs have not alleged that they were injured as a result of
the stock purchase, and none of the remedies sought concern
the stock. Additionally, the justifications for excluding
securities transactions from the scope of § 75-1.1 do not apply in
this case. Defendant’s actions would not subject it to liability
under any of the federal or state securities law. Also, the
relationship between [Defendant] and the [Plaintiffs] more
closely resembles an ordinary business transaction than the
issuance of stock to raise capital. In this case, the stock sale was
ancillary to the main purpose of the transaction, the [Plaintiffs]
opening an Ace store in Salisbury. The remainder of the
transaction is subject to the requirements of the unfair and
deceptive trade practices statute.117

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id. at *5.
No. 4:92CV00454, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10818 (M.D.N.C. July 7, 1995).
Id. at *18.
See id. at *13.
Id. at *19.
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In Katen v. Katen,118 the defendants bought the plaintiff out of
the family company through a series of agreements over a ten-year
period.119 The plaintiff later brought a slew of claims, including one
under section 75-1.1.120 The court held that the securities exemption
did not bar the plaintiff’s section 75-1.1 claim because the sale of
stock was “but one of this series of agreements alleged to have been
reached between the parties from 1981 to 1991. Plaintiff’s entire claim
[did] not rise or fall upon that one transaction.”121 This decision
suggests that more regular or recurring transactions could establish
ordinary business activities under the statute and allow claims
tenuously related to securities to survive a motion to dismiss.
V. REAFFIRMING SECTION 75-1.1’S BROAD REMEDIAL PURPOSE
Straightforward remedies correcting the confusion and difficulty
of the HAJMM standard do exist, and the time is ripe for either
judicial or legislative reaffirmation of section 75-1.1 as a useful tool to
combat unfairness and deception in business transactions.
Narrowness is often a virtue in applying section 75-1.1’s extraordinary
damages provision, but the categorical dismissals of otherwise viable
claims following HAJMM highlight the gaps the decision created.
This Part first explores possible legislative remedies. The discussion
then addresses the possibility that the Supreme Court of North
Carolina could overturn HAJMM by acknowledging the
extraordinary event doctrine’s failure to address situations like Latigo
or Tillery.
A. Legislative Revision or Guidance
The most expedient solution for section 75-1.1’s weakness in
addressing regulation-related issues after HAJMM would be a
legislative effort to expand section 75-1.1 as a backstop regulatory
tool. The General Assembly has an interest in protecting businesses
and consumers alike when regulatory structures do not address
unfairness or deception in any business transaction. As discussed
above, decisions from the Supreme Court of North Carolina
restricting the scope of prior versions of section 75-1.1 prompted a
legislative restructuring that provided the present statute’s broad
118.
119.
120.
121.

No. 5:97-CV-275-BR(2), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21439 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 18, 1997).
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *18.
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powers to combat unfairness and deception.122 The legislature’s
previous reluctance to intervene may be related to HAJMM’s
purported justification that section 75-1.1 ultimately means to protect
the consumer, and one-off transactions between businesses do not
sufficiently affect the consumer. However, instances like Latigo and
Tillery show that reading section 75-1.1 so narrowly precludes
protection that the statute originally meant to provide. It is no longer
“a broad remedial statute.”123
The General Assembly could reinvigorate section 75-1.1’s
usefulness in one of two ways. First, the legislature could add a
subsection to the statute that provides judicial discretion to allow a
claim to survive as a matter of law unless the judge can identify
another regulatory remedy, whether public or private, which more
appropriately or effectively addresses the alleged misconduct. Second,
language could be added to ensure section 75-1.1 claims reach the
merits of alleged unfairness or deception unless the conduct clearly
falls within a pervasive and intricate regulatory scheme. While judges
certainly could work to identify an alternative scheme that may apply,
the second proposal may clarify the statute’s application and allow
both more effective litigation and claim resolution based on the
merits of the case.
The first option, expanding judicial discretion, would serve as the
General Assembly’s endorsement of North Carolina’s Business Court
judges to effectively handle and dispose of complex business litigation
matters.124 The legislature could acknowledge that section 75-1.1
claims provide particularly thorny issues by directing judges to
dispose of cases at their discretion when those cases are better
resolved elsewhere. Judges should have more discretion to deny
motions to dismiss when section 75-1.1 protections could supplement
questionably applicable regulations. However, expanding judicial
discretion in cases that already involve various unclear definitions of
122. See Rebecca A. Fiss, A Bump in the Road of Consumer Protection: How Bumpers
v. Community Bank of Northern Virginia Stripped Section 75-1.1 of Its Ability to Protect
Borrowers, 92 N.C. L. REV. 2145, 2145–46 (2014) (discussing the North Carolina General
Assembly’s amendment of “the statute to broadly include ‘all business practices, however
denominated’”).
123. Latigo Invs. II, LLC v. Waddell & Reed Fin., Inc., No. 06 CVS 18666, 2007 WL
2570753, at *4 (N.C. Bus. Ct. May 22, 2007).
124. See Mack Sperling, About This Blog, BROOKS PIERCE: N.C. BUS. LITIG. REP.,
https://www.ncbusinesslitigationreport.com/about-this-blog/ [https://perma.cc/MQK7-4FGX]
(referring to the North Carolina Business Court as “North Carolina’s equivalent of the
Delaware Court of Chancery”).
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unfairness may further the problems created by HAJMM rather than
limit them.125 A more definitive stance on the role and scope of
section 75-1.1 from the state legislature would enhance a judge’s
ability to allow or dismiss claims.
The second option essentially involves a legislative endorsement
of the Skinner reasoning that pervasive and intricate regulation
should preclude section 75-1.1 protection, while clarifying that the
HAJMM expansion does not apply where conduct falls outside of
another regulatory scheme. Critics of this approach may argue that
expanding section 75-1.1 applicability back to Skinner would simply
lead to more frivolous claims muddying Business Court dockets after
motions to dismiss, but the statute’s effect of deterring unfairness and
deception relies on the possibility that claims could reach trial.
Exemptions like HAJMM mean claims with merit may not survive
simply because they come too close to a poorly defined category and
not because they fail to allege unfairness or deception. If section 751.1 claims arguably related to an exempt category, like securities,
survived dismissal unless a regulatory scheme clearly precluded them,
defendants would need to identify the particular avenue that a
plaintiff should pursue instead of a section 75-1.1 claim for general
unfairness or deception. Such added clarity in the pleadings would
allow judges to make more decisions on the merits rather than
acknowledge that the claim falls under a large umbrella of an
exemption like HAJMM, the bounds of which are unclear and
difficult to justify. Clear statutory language designed to regulate all
unfair or deceptive conduct—up to the pervasive and intricate
regulations governing particular circumstances—would increase the
number of section 75-1.1 claims judged on their merits and prevent
the proliferation of judicially crafted exemptions that effectively bar
paths to a remedy.
B.

Judicial Solutions

Absent legislative action, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
could emulate the reasoning in Tillery and Latigo by extending
section 75-1.1 protection into circumstances where regulations do not
already occupy the field or provide more effective remedies. The
court could take further guidance from the Fourth Circuit’s logic in
125. See Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 1, at 2051 (outlining varying definitions and
explaining that “[b]ecause of the broad and vague nature of these definitions, courts have
struggled to decide whether particular conduct is unfair”).

97 N.C. L. REV. 163 (2018)

2018]

HAJMM LEGACY

189

Champion Pro and hold that private remedies, like the NFLPA’s
enforcement apparatus, suffice to preclude section 75-1.1 claims.126 A
binding North Carolina decision to that effect would solidify section
75-1.1 as a regulatory tool while also giving lower courts latitude to
dismiss cases employing section 75-1.1 as a settlement multiplier in
lieu of another more appropriate remedy. Most importantly, though,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina, now under Chief Justice
Martin’s leadership, should revisit his skepticism towards an
expansion of the Skinner doctrine of pervasive and intricate
regulation to the extraordinary event exemption of HAJMM that
casts an overbroad and undefined shadow over section 75-1.1
jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
Judicial exemptions erode section 75-1.1’s effectiveness when
lower courts apply the exemption categorically rather than in a
discretionary manner. Section 75-1.1 serves to “create a new, private
cause of action for aggrieved consumers since traditional common law
remedies were often deficient.”127 The Supreme Court of North
Carolina additionally notes “that the purposes of the statutory
provisions for treble money damages, N.C.G.S. § 75-16, and
attorneys’ fees, N.C.G.S. § 75-16.1, were to encourage private
enforcement in the marketplace and to make the bringing of such a
suit more economically feasible.”128 Since “unfairness and deception
are gauged by consideration of the effect of the practice on the
marketplace,”129 the state of the law after HAJMM leaves section 751.1 inapplicable regardless of the availability of a remedy through
other channels. A business engaged in a securities transaction of little
or no interest to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
should still have an opportunity to recover under section 75-1.1 when
unfairness or deception occurs.
Moreover, fundraising activities are so vitally important to
businesses that they may as well qualify as day-to-day even if they

126. See Champion Pro Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Impact Sports Football, LLC, 845 F.3d
104, 110 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that section 75-1.1 was not necessary to address the
defendant’s conduct because there were already “well-established internal systems of
governance . . . in place”).
127. Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 95, 331 S.E.2d 677, 680 (1985)
(citing Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 543, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1981)).
128. Id. (citing Marshall, 302 N.C. at 548, 276 S.E.2d at 403–04).
129. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 548, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981).
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occur infrequently. The HAJMM rule, which precludes claims arising
out of unusual circumstances for the business, weakens the statute.
Therefore, it is time for section 75-1.1 to regain its utility as “a broad
remedial statute.”130 Transactions between businesses generally fall
within the scope of section 75-1.1, meaning that a party to a
transaction may invoke the statute’s protections against its
counterpart in appropriate circumstances.131 Business transactions,
though, may also be subject to considerable regulatory structures,
such as securities laws. Where these regulatory structures cover the
transaction and provide the plaintiff a remedy, applying section 75-1.1
too broadly may only muddy the already murky waters of business
regulation. Courts and practitioners must determine if regulatory
structures essentially preempt section 75-1.1 claims by providing an
alternative path to recovery, such as filing a complaint with the SEC
rather than the North Carolina Business Court. When there is no
clearly applicable road to recovery in tort or a regulatory structure,
however, it would appear section 75-1.1 is uniquely positioned and
arguably intended to fill a gap and provide a cause of action against
unfairness or deception.132 These gaps highlight section 75-1.1’s utility
as a regulatory gap-filler to combat unfairness and deception because
section 75-1.1 is redundant if regulatory channels could provide a
remedy.133
North Carolina does not benefit from litigants asserting baseless
claims that business ventures have been unfair or deceptive in dealing
with each other, using section 75-1.1 and its damages multiplier to
improperly influence their counterpart to settle. The state’s business
community will operate most efficiently and effectively when
businesspeople are confident that their counterparts will not
130. Latigo Invs. II, LLC v. Waddell & Reed Fin., Inc., No. 06 CVS 18666, 2007 WL
2570753, at *4 (N.C. Bus. Ct. May 22, 2007).
131. See United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 665, 370 S.E.2d 375, 389 (1988)
(holding that section 75-1.1 is “not limited . . . to cases involving consumers only” because
“unfair trade practices involving only businesses affect the consumer as well”); 1 NOEL L.
ALLEN, NORTH CAROLINA UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICE § 6.05, at 6–9 (3d ed. 2018)
(“[T]he North Carolina Supreme Court has declared that § 75-1.1 was intended by the
General Assembly to ‘regulate a business’s regular interactions with other market
participants.’” (quoting White v. Thompson, 364 N.C. 47, 51, 691 S.E.2d 676, 679 (2010))).
132. See Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper Servs., Inc., 108 N.C. App. 169, 172,
423 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1992) (“The statute was created to provide an additional remedy
apart from those less adequate remedies afforded under common law causes of action for
fraud, breach of contract, or breach of warranty. The result was a broader cause of action
with broader remedies.”).
133. Feldman, supra note 45.
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immediately sue them for unfair and deceptive conduct if a deal goes
wrong. A negotiation conducted under the cloud of easily accessible
windfalls through treble damages encourages transparency and
fairness no more than it encourages unnecessary levels of due
diligence and tentative forecasting about the future. Conversely, the
availability of section 75-1.1 protection may function as a regulatory
safety net in appropriate circumstances where no other regulations
address bad conduct. A businessperson who has suffered from unfair
or deceptive conduct, even during an extraordinary business activity
like selling a company, should retain access to section 75-1.1
remedies. In deciding whether a section 75-1.1 exemption applies,
courts should only dismiss these claims as a matter of law when the
conduct is addressed by another pervasive regulatory structure and a
remedy under that structure is reasonably available.
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